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Restitution: A New Paradigm of Criminal 
Justice* 
Randy E. Barnett 
Harvard Law School 
This paper will analyze the breakdown of our system of criminal justice in 
terms of what Thomas Kuhn would describe as a crisis of an old para- 
digm-punishment. I propose that this crisis could be solved by the adop- 
tion of a new paradigm of criminal justice-restitution. The approach will 
be mainly theoretical, though at various points in the discussion the practi- 
cal implications of the rival paradigms will also be considered. A fundamen- 
tal contention will be that many, if not most, of our system's ills stem from 
errors in the underlying paradigm. Any attempt to correct these symptomat- 
ic debilities without a reexamination of the theoretical underpinnings is 
doomed to frustration and failure. Kuhn's theories deal with the problems 
of science. What made his proposal so startling was its attempt to analogize 
scientific development to social and political development. Here, I will 
simply reverse the process by applying Kuhn's framework of scientific 
change to social, or in this case, legal development.' 
*This paper was made possible by a research fellowship from the Law and Liberty Project of 
the Institute for Humane Studies, Menlo Park, California. A somewhat expanded version of it will 
appear in the book, Assessing the Criminal. Restitution, Retribution and the Legal Process, ed. Randy E. 
Barnett and John Hagel (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., in press). Also, I wish to 
extend my appreciation to John V. Cody, Davis E. Keeler, Murray N. Rothbard, and Lloyd L. 
Weinreb for their invaluable criticism and comments. I am greatly in their debt and hope to be able 
at some future time to make suitable restitution. 
1. What immediately follows is a brief outline of Kuhn's theory. Those interested in the 
defense of that theory should refer to his book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2d ed., enl. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970). A paradigm is an achievement in a particular discipline 
which defines the legitimate problems and methods of research within that discipline. This achieve- 
ment is sufficiently unprecedented to attract new adherents away from rival approaches while provid- 
ing many unsolved questions for these new practitioners to solve. As the paradigm develops and 
matures, it reveals occasional inabilities to solve new problems and explain new data. As attempts are 
made to make the facts fit the paradigm, the theoretical apparatus gradually becomes bulky and 
awkward, like Ptolemaic astronomy. Dissatisfaction with the paradigm begins to grow. Why not 
simply discard the paradigm and find another which better fits the facts? Unfortunately, this is an 
arduous process. All the great authorities and teachers were raised with the current paradigm and see 
the world through it. All the texts and institutions are committed to it. Radical alternatives hold 
promise but are so untested as to make wary all but the bold. The establishment is loath to abandon 
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In the criminal justice system we are witnessing the death throes of an 
old and cumbersome paradigm, one that has dominated Western thought 
for more than 900 years. While this paper presents what is hoped to be a 
viable, though radical alternative, much would be accomplished by simply 
prompting the reader to reexamine the assumptions underlying the present 
system. Only if we are willing to look at our old problems in a new light 
do we stand a chance of solving them. This is our only hope, and our 
greatest challenge. 
THE CRISIS IN THE PARADIGM OF PUNISHMENT 
"Political revolutions are inaugurated by a growing sense, often re- 
stricted to a segment of the political community, that existing institutions 
have ceased adequately to meet the problems posed by an environment they 
have in part created. . . . In both political and scientific development the 
sense of malfunction that can lead to crisis is prerequisite to revolution."2 
Kuhn's description of the preconditions for scientific and political revolu- 
tions could accurately describe the current state of the criminal law. Howev- 
er, simply to recognize the existence of a crisis is not enough. We must 
look for its causes. The Kuhnian methodology suggests that we critically 
examine the paradigm of punishment itself. 
The problems which the paradigm of punishment is supposed to solve 
are many and varied. A whole literature on the philosophy of punishment 
has arisen in an effort to justify or reject the institution of punishment. For 
our purposes the following definition from the Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
should suffice: "Characteristically punishment is unpleasant. It is inflicted 
on an offender because of an offense he has committed; it is deliberately 
imposed, not just the natural consequence of a person's action (like a 
hangover), and the unpleasantness is essential to it, not an accompaniment to 
some other treatment (like the pain of the dentist's drill)."' 
Two types of arguments are commonly made in defense of punish- 
ment. The first is that punishment is an appropriate means to some justifi- 
able end such as, for example, deterrence of crime. The second type of 
argument is that punishment is justified as an end in itself. On this view, 
whatever ill effects it might engender, punishment for its own sake is good. 
The first type of argument might be called the political justification of 
its broad and intricate theory in favor of a new and largely unknown hypothesis. Gradually, however, 
as the authorities die off and the problems with the old paradigm increase, the "young turks" get a 
better hearing in both the journals and the classroom. In a remarkably rapid fashion, the old 
paradigm is discarded for the new. Anyone who still clings to it is now considered to be antiquated 
or eccentric and is simply read out of the profession. All research centers on the application of the 
new paradigm. Kuhn characterizes this overthrow of one paradigm by another as a revolution. 
2. Ibid., p. 92. 
3. Stanley I. Benn, "Punishment," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards (New 
York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1967), 7.: 29 (emphasis added). 
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punishment, for the end which justifies its use is one which a political 
order is presumably dedicated to serve: the maintenance of peaceful interac- 
tions between individuals and groups in a society. There are at least three 
ways that deliberate infliction of harm on an offender is said to be politi- 
cally justified. 
* 1. One motive for punishment, especially capital punishment and im- 
prisonment, is the "intention to deprive offenders of the power of doing 
future mischief."4 Although it is true that an offender cannot continue to 
harm society while incarcerated, a strategy of punishment based on disable- 
ment has several drawbacks. 
Imprisonment is enormously expensive. This means that a double bur- 
den is placed on the innocent who must suffer the crime and, in addition, 
pay through taxation for the support of the offender and his family if they 
are forced onto welfare. Also, any benefit of imprisonment is temporary; 
eventually, most offenders will be released. If their outlook has not im- 
proved-and especially if it has worsened-the benefits of incarceration are 
obviously limited. Finally, when disablement is permanent, as with capital 
punishment or psychosurgery, it is this very permanence, in light of the 
possibility of error, which is frightening. For these reasons, "where disable- 
ment enters as an element into penal theories, it occupies, as a rule, a 
subordinate place and is looked upon as an object subsidiary to some other 
end which is regarded as paramount. ... 
2. Rehabilitiation of a criminal means a change in his mental habits so 
that he will not offend again. It is unclear whether the so-called treatment 
model which views criminals as a doctor would view a patient is truly a 
"retributive" concept. Certainly it does not conform to the above definition 
characterizing punishment as deliberately and essentially unpleasant. It is an 
open question whether any end justifies the intentional, forceful manipula- 
tion of an individual's thought processes by anyone, much less the state. To 
say that an otherwise just system has incidentally rehabilitative effects 
which may be desirable is one thing, but it is quite another to argue that 
these effects themselves justify the system. The horrors to which such 
reasoning can lead are obvious from abundant examples in history and 
contemporary society.6 
Rehabilitation as a reaction against the punishment paradigm will be 
considered below, but one aspect is particularly relevant to punishment as 
defined here. On this view, the visiting of unpleasantness itself will cause 
the offender to see the error of his ways; by having "justice" done him, the 
criminal will come to appreciate his error and will change his moral out- 
look. This end, best labeled "reformation," is speculative at best and coun- 
terfactual at worst. On the contrary, "it has been observed that, as a rule 
4. Heinrich Oppenheimer, The Rationale of Punishment (London: University of London Press, 
1913), p. 255. 
5. Ibid. 
6. See Thomas Szasz, Law, Liberty, and Psychiaty -(New York: Macmillan Co., .1963). 
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. . . ruthless punishments, far from mollifying men's ways, corrupt them 
and stir them to violence."7 
3. The final justification to be treated here-deterrence-actually has 
two aspects. The first is the deterrent effect that past demonstrations of 
punishment have on the future conduct of others; the second is the effect 
that threats of future punishment have on the conduct of others. The 
distinction assumes importance when some advocates argue that future 
threats lose their deterrent effect when there is a lack of past demonstra- 
tions. Past punishment, then, serves as an educational tool. It is a substitute 
for or reinforcement of threats of future punishment. 
As with the goals mentioned above, the empirical question of whether 
punishment has this effect is a disputed one.8 I shall not attempt to resolve 
this question here, but will assume arguendo that punishment even as pres- 
ently administered has some deterrent effect. It is the moral question which 
is disturbing. Can an argument from deterrence alone "justify" in any sense 
the infliction of pain on a criminal? It is particularly disquieting that the 
actual levying of punishment is done not for the criminal himself, but for 
the educational impact it will have on the community. The criminal act 
becomes the occasion of, but not the reason for, the punishment. In this 
way, the actual crime becomes little more than an excuse for punishing. 
Surely this distorts the proper functioning of the judicial process. For if 
deterrence is the end it is unimportant whether the individual actually 
committed the crime. Since the public's perception of guilt is the prerequi- 
site of the deterrent effect, all that is required for deterrence is that the 
individual is "proved" to have committed the crime. The actual occurrence 
would have no relevance except insofar as a truly guilty person is easier to 
prove guilty. The judicial process becomes, not a truth-seeking device, but 
solely a means to legitimate the use of force. To treat criminals as means to 
the ends of others in this way raises serious moral problems. This is not to 
argue that men may never use others as means but rather to question the 
use of force against the individual because of the effect such use will have 
on others. It was this that concerned del Vecchio when he stated that "the 
human person always bears in himself something sacred, and it is therefore 
not permissable to treat him merely as a means towards an end ouside of 
himself."9 
Finally, deterrence as the ultimate justification of punishment cannot 
rationally limit its use. It "provides no guidance until we're told how much 
commission of it is to be deterred."'" Since there are always some who 
commit crimes, one can always argue for more punishment. Robert Nozick 
points out that there must be criteria by which one decides how much 
7. Giorgio del Vecchio, "The Struggle against Crime," in The Philosophy of Punishment, ed. H. 
B. Acton (London: Macmillan Co., 1969), p. 199. 
8. See, e.g., Samuel Yochelson and Stanton E. Samenow, The Criminal Personality, vol. 1, A 
Profile for Change (New York: Jason Aronson, Inc., 1976), pp. 411-16. 
9. Del Vecchio, p. 199. 
10. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p. 61. 
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deterrence may be inflicted." One is forced therefore to employ "higher" 
principles to evaluate the legitimacy of punishment. 
It is not my thesis that deterrence, reformation, and disablement are 
undesirable goals. On the contrary, any criminal justice system should be 
critically examined to see if it is having these and other beneficial effects. 
The view advanced here is simply that these utilitarian benefits must be 
incidental to a just system; they cannot, alone or in combination, justify a 
criminal justice system. Something more is needed. There is another more 
antiquated strain of punishment theory which seeks to address this prob- 
lem. The moral justifications of punishment view punishment as an end in 
itself. This approach has taken many forms.'2 On this view, whatever ill or 
beneficial results it might have, punishment of lawbreakers is good for its 
own sake. This proposition can be analyzed on several levels. 
-The most basic question is the truth of the claim itself. Some have 
argued that "the alleged absolute justice of repaying evil with evil (main- 
tained by Kant and many other writers) is really an empty sophism. If we 
go back to the Christian moralists, we find that an evil is to be put right 
only by doing good."'3 This question is beyond the scope of this treatment. 
The subject has been extensively dealt with by those more knowledgeable 
than "14 The more relevant question is what such a view of punishment as 
a good can be said to imply for a system of criminal justice. Even assuming 
that it would be good if, in the nature of things, the wicked got their 
"come-uppance," what behavior does this moral fact justify? Does it justify 
the victim authoring the punishment of his offender? Does it justify the 
same action by the victim's family, his friends, his neighbors, the state? If 
so what punishment should be imposed and who should decide? 
It might be argued that the natural punishment for the violation of 
natural rights is the deserved hatred and scorn of the community, the 
resultant ostracism, and the existential hell of being an evil person. The 
question then is not whether we have the right to inflict some "harm" or 
unpleasantness on a morally contemptible person-surely, we do; the ques- 
tion is not whether such a punishment is "good"-arguably, it is. The issue 
is whether the "virtue of some punishment" justifies the forceful imposition 
of unpleasantness on a rights violator as distinguished from the morally 
imperfect. Any moral theory of punishment must recognize and deal with 
this distinction. Finally, it must be established that the state is the legiti- 
mate author of punishment, a proposition which further assumes the moral 
and legal legitimacy of the state. To raise these issues is not to resolve 
them, but it would seem that the burden of proof is on those seeking to 
justify the use of force against the individual. Suffice it to say that I am 
11. Ibid., pp. 59-63. 
12. For a concise summary, see Oppenheimer, p. 31. 
13. Del Vecchio, p. 198. 
14. See, e.g., Walter Kaufmann, Without Guilt andJustice (New York: Peter H. Wyden, Inc., 
1973), esp. chap. 2. 
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skeptical of finding any theory which justifies the deliberate, forceful impo- 
sition of punishment within or without a system of criminal justice. 
The final consideration in dealing with punishment as an end in itself 
is the possibility that the current crisis in the criminal justice system is in 
fact a crisis of the paradigm of punishment. While this, if true, does not 
resolve the philosophical issues, it does cast doubt on the punishment 
paradigm's vitality as the motive force behind a system of criminal justice. 
Many advocates of punishment argue that its apparent practical failings 
exist because we are not punishing enough. All that is needed, they say, is 
a crackdown on criminals and those victims and witnesses who shun partici- 
pation in the criminal justice system; the only problem with the paradigm 
of punishment is that we are not following it." This response fails to 
consider why the system doggedly refuses to punish to the degree required 
to yield beneficial results and instead punishes in such a way as to yield 
harmful results. The answer may be that the paradigm of punishment is in 
eclipse, that the public lacks the requisite will to apply it in anything but 
the prevailing way. 
Punishment, particularly state punishment is the descendant of the 
tradition which imparts religious and moral authority to the sovereign and, 
through him, the community. Such an authority is increasingly less credible 
in a secular world such as ours. Today there is an increasing desire to allow 
each individual to govern his own life as he sees fit provided he does not 
violate the rights of others. This desire is exemplified by current attitudes 
toward drug use, abortion, and pornography. Few argue that these things 
are good. It is only said that where there is no victim the state or commu- 
nity has no business meddling in the peaceful behavior of its citizens, 
however morally suspect it may be.'6 
Furthermore, if the paradigm of punishment is in a "crisis period" it is 
as much because of its practical drawbacks as the uncertainty of its moral 
status. The infliction of suffering on a criminal tends to cause a general 
feeling of sympathy for him. There is no rational connection between a 
term of imprisonment and the harm caused the victim. Since the prison 
term is supposed to be unpleasant, at least a part of the public comes to see 
the criminal as a victim, and the lack of rationality also causes the offender 
to feel victimized. This reaction is magnified by the knowledge that most 
crimes go unpunished and that even if the offender is caught the judicial 
process is long, arduous, and far removed from the criminal act. While this 
is obvious to most, it is perhaps less obvious that the punishment paradigm 
is largely at fault. The slow, ponderous nature of our system of justice is 
largely due to a fear of an unjust infliction of punishment on the innocent 
(or even the guilty). The more awful the sanction, the more elaborate need 
15. See, e.g., "Crime: A Case for More Punishment," Business Week (September 15, 1975), pp. 
92-97. 
16. This problem is examined, though not ultimately resolved, by Edwin M. Schur in his book 
Crimes without Victims-Deviant Behavior and Public Policy, Abortion, Homosexuality, and Drug Addic- 
tion (Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965). 
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be the safeguards. The more the system is perceived as arbitrary and unfair, 
the more incentive there is for defendants and their counsel to thwart the 
truth-finding process. Acquittal becomes desirable at all costs. As the puni- 
tive aspect of a sanction is diminished, so too would be the perceived need 
for procedural protections. 
A system of punishment, furthermore, offers no incentive for the 
victim to involve himself in the criminal justice process other than to 
satisfy his feelings of duty or revenge. The victim stands to gain little if at 
all by the conviction and punishment of the person who caused his loss. 
This is true even of those systems discussed below which despense state 
compensation based on the victim's need. The system of justice itself im- 
poses uncompensated costs by requiring a further loss of time and money 
by the victim and witnesses'and by increasing the perceived risk of retalia- 
tion. 
Finally, punishment which seeks to change an offender's moral out- 
look, or at least to scare him, can do nothing to provide him with the skills 
needed to survive in the outside world. In prison, he learns the advanced 
state of the criminal arts and vows not to repeat the mistake that led to his 
capture. The convict emerges better trained and highly motivated to contin- 
ue a criminal career. 
The crisis of the paradigm of punishment has at its roots the collapse 
of its twin pillars of support: its moral legitimacy and its practical efficacy. 
As Kaufmann concludes, "the faith in retributive justice is all but dead."'7 
ATTEMPTS TO SALVAGE THE PARADIGM OF PUNISHMENT 
"All crises begin with the blurring of a paradigm and the consequent 
loosening of the rules for normal research."'8 And yet until a new paradigm 
is presented, authorities will cling to the old one, either ignoring the prob- 
lem or salvaging the paradigm with ad hoc explanations and solutions. 
Why are -paradigms never rejected outright? Why must there always be a 
new paradigm before the old one is abandoned? Kuhn does not explicitly 
discuss this, but R. A. Childs hypothesizes "that, as such, paradigms may 
serve the function of increasing man's sense of control over some aspect of 
reality, or some aspect of his own life. If this is so, then we would expect 
that a straightforward abandonment of a paradigm would threaten that 
sense of control."'9 
This psychological need for an explanation may in turn explain the 
many efforts to shore up the paradigm of punishment. The three attempts 
to be examined next have at their roots a perception of its fundamental 
errors, and at the same time they highlight three goals of any new paradigm 
of criminal justice. 
1. Proportionate punishment. The king abandoned the composition 
17. Kaufmann, p. 46. 
18. Kuhn, p. 82. 
19. R. A. Childs, "Liberty and the Paradigm of Statism," in The Libertarian Alternative, ed. 
Tibor Machan (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Co., 1974), p. 505. 
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system20 for the system of punishment because punishment struck terror in 
the hearts of the people, and this served to inspire awe for the power of the 
king and state. But there was no rational connection between the serious- 
ness of the crime and the gravity of the punishment and, therefore, no limit 
to the severity of punishment. Hideous tortures came to be employed: "But 
some of the men of the Enlightenment sought to counter the inhumanity 
of their Christian predecessors with appeals to reason. They thought that 
retributive justice had a mathematical quality and that murder called for 
capital punishment in much the same way in which two plus two equals 
four."21 
The appeal to proportionality was one of the early attempts to come to 
grips with deficiencies in the paradigm of punishment. It was doomed to 
failure, for there is no objective standard by which punishments can be 
proportioned to fit the crime. Punishment is incommensurate with crime. 
This solution is purely ad hoc and intuitive. We shall, however, find the 
goal of proportionate sentencing useful in the formation of a new paradigm. 
2. Rehabilitation. It was noted earlier that the infliction of punishment 
tends to focus attention on the plight of the criminal. Possibly for this 
reason, the next humanitarian trend was to explore the proper treatment of 
criminals. Punishment failed to reform the criminal, and this led observers 
to inquire how the situation might be improved. Some felt that the sole end 
of the penal system was rehabilitation, so attention was turned to modify- 
ing the criminal's behavior (an obviously manipulative end). Emphasis was 
placed on education, job training, and discipline. 
Unfortunately, the paradigm of punishment and the political realities 
of penal administration have all but won out. There is simply no incentive 
for prison authorities to educate and train. Their job is essentially political. 
They are judged by their ability to keep the prisoners within the walls and 
to keep incidents of violence within the prison to a minimum; as a result, 
discipline is the main concern. Furthermore, since he is sentenced to a fixed 
number of years (less time off for good behavior-so-called good time), 
there is no institutional incentive for the prisoner to improve himself apart 
from sheer boredom. Productive labor in prison is virtually nonexistent, 
with only obsolete equipment, if any, available. Except perhaps for license 
plates and other state needs, the prisoners produce nothing of value; the 
prisons make no profit and the workers are paid, if at all, far below market 
wages. They are unable to support themselves or their families. The state, 
meaning the innocent taxpayer, supports the prisoner, and frequently the 
families as well via welfare. 
20. Composition was the medieval version of a restitutionary system. For a fascinating outline 
of how such a system operated and how it came to be supplanted by state-authored punishment, see 
Stephen Schafer, Compensation and Restitution to Victims of Crime, 2d ed., enl. (Montclair, NJ.: 
Patterson Smith Publishing Corp., 1970); Richard E. Laster, "Criminal Restitution: A Survey of Its 
Past History and an Analysis of Its Present Usefulness," University of Richmond Law Review 5 (1970): 
71-80; L. T. Hobhouse, Morals in Evolution (London: Chapman & Hall, 1951). 
21. Kaufmann, p. 45. 
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Rehabilitation has been a long-time goal of the penal system, but the 
political nature of government-run prisons and the dominance of the para- 
digm of punishment has inevitably prevented its achievement. Prisons re- 
main detention centers, all too temporarily preventing crime by physically 
confining the criminals. 
3. Victim compensation. It is natural that the brutalities resulting from 
the paradigm of punishment would get first attention from humanitarians 
and that the persons subjected to those practices would be next. Until 
recently, the victim of crime was the forgotten party. Within the last few 
years a whole new field has opened up called victimology.22 With it has 
come a variety of proposals, justifications, and statutes.23 
Certain features are common to virtually every compensation proposal: 
(a) Compensation for crimes would be dispensed by the state from tax 
revenue. (b) Compensation is "a matter of grace" rather than an assumption 
by the state of legal responsibility for the criminal loss suffered by the 
victim. (c) Most proposals allow for aid only on a "need" or "hardship" 
basis. (d) Most are limited to some sort of crime of violence or the threat 
of force or violence. (e) None questions the paradigm of punishment. 
The goal of these proposals and statutes is laudable. The victim is the 
forgotten man of crime. But the means proposed is the same tired formula: 
welfare to those in "need." In short, the innocent taxpayer repays the 
innocent victim (if the victim can prove he "needs" help) while the guilty 
offender is subjected to the sanction of punishment with all its failings. 
Like proportionate punishment and rehabilitation, the goal of victim com- 
pensation is a recognition of very real problems in our criminal justice 
system, and at the same time it ignores the source of these problems: our 
conception of crime as an offense against the state whose proper sanction is 
punishment. Until a viable, new paradigm is presented, ad hoc solutions like 
the ones discussed here are all that can be hoped for. And it is a vain hope 
indeed, for they attack the symptoms while neglecting the causes of the 
problem. What is needed is a new paradigm. 
OUTLINE OF A NEW PARADIGM 
The idea of restitution is actually quite simple. It views crime as an 
offense by one individual against the rights of another. The victim has 
suffered a loss. Justice consists of the culpable offender making good the 
loss he has caused. It calls for a complete refocusing of our image of crime. 
Kuhn would call it a "shift of world-view." Where we once saw an offense 
against society, we now see an offense against an individual victim. In a 
22. For a brief definition of victimologyy," see Emilo C. Viano, "Victimology: The Study of 
the Victim," Victimology 1 (1976): 1-7. For an extensive collection of papers on various aspects of 
victimology, see Emilo C. Viano, ed., Victims and Society (Washington, D.C.: Visage Press, 1976). 
23. For a discussion and list of symposiums, journal articles, and statutes concerning victim 
compensation, see Steven Schafer, pp. 139-57, and appendix; see also Joe Hudson and Burt Galaway, 
eds., Considering the Victim: Readings in Restitution and Victim Compensation (Springfield, Ill.: Charles 
C. Thomas, 1975), esp. pp. 361-436. 
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way, it is a common sense view of crime. The armed robber did not rob society; 
he robbed the victim. His debt, therefore, is not to society; it is to the victim. 
There are really two types of restitution proposals: a system of "punitive" 
restitution and a "pure" restitutional system. 
1. Punitive restitution. "Since rehabilitation was admitted to the aims 
of penal law two centuries ago, the number of penological aims has re- 
mained virtually constant. Restitution is waiting to come in."24 Given this 
view, restitution should merely be added to the paradigm of punishment. 
Stephen Schafer outlines the proposal: "[Punitive] restitution, like punish- 
ment, must always be the subject of judicial consideration. Without excep- 
tion it must be carried out by personal performance by the wrong-doer, and 
should even then be equally burdensome and just for all criminals, irrespec- 
tive of their means, whether they be millionaires or labourers."25 
There are many ways by which such a goal might be reached. The 
offender might be forced to compensate the victim by his own work, either 
in prison or out. If it came out of his pocket or from the sale of his 
property this would compensate the victim, but it would not be sufficiently 
unpleasant for the offender. Another proposal would be that the fines be 
proportionate to the earning power of the criminal. Thus, "A poor man 
would pay in days of work, a rich man by an equal number of days' income 
or salary."26 Herbert Spencer made a proposal along similar lines in his 
excellent "Prison-Ethics," which is well worth examining.27 Murray N. 
Rothbard and others have proposed a system of "double payments" in cases 
of criminal behavior.28 While closer to pure restitution than other propos- 
als, the "double damages" concept preserves a punitive aspect. 
Punitive restitution is an attempt to gain the benefits of pure restitu- 
tion, which will be considered shortly, while retaining the perceived advan- 
tages of the paradigm of punishment. Thus, the prisoner is still "sen- 
tenced" to some unpleasantness-prison labor or loss of X number of days' 
income. That the intention is to preserve the "hurt" is indicated by the 
hesitation to accept an out-of-pocket payment or sale of assets. This is 
considered too "easy" for the criminal and takes none of his time. The 
amount of payment is determined not by the actual harm but by the ability 
of the offender to pay. Of course, by retaining the paradigm of punishment 
this proposal involves many of the problems we raised earlier. In this sense 
it can be considered another attempt to salvage the old paradigm. 
2. Pure restitution. "Recompense or restitution is scarcely a punishment 
as long as it is merely a matter of returning stolen goods or money. ... 
24. Gerhard 0. W. Mueller, "Compensation for Victims of Crime: Thought before Action," 
Minnesota Law Review 50 (1965): 221. 
25. Schafer, p. 127. 
26. Ibid. 
27. Herbert Spencer, "Prison-Ethics," in Essays. Scientific, Political and Speculative (New York: 
D. Appleton & Co., 1907), 3:152-91. 
28. Murray N. Rothbard, Libertarian Forum 14, no. 1 (January 1972): 7-8. 
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The point is not that the offender deserves to suffer; it is rather that the 
offended party desires compensation."29 This represents the complete over- 
throw of the paradigm of punishment. No longer would the deterrence, 
reformation, disablement, or rehabilitation of the criminal be the guiding 
principle of the judicial system. The attainment of these goals would be 
incidental to, and as a result of, reparations paid to the victim. No longer 
would the criminal deliberately be made to suffer for his mistake. Making 
good that mistake is all that would be required. What follows is a possible 
scenario of such a system. 
When a crime occurred and a suspect was apprehended, a trial court 
would attempt to determine his guilt or innocence. If found guilty, the 
criminal would be sentenced to make restitution to the victim.30 If a crimi- 
nal is able to make restitution immediately, he may do so. This would 
discharge his liability. If he were unable to make restitution, but were 
found by the court to be trustworthy, he would be permitted to remain at 
his job (or find a new one) while paying restitution out of his future 
wages. This would entail a legal claim against future wages. Failure to pay 
could result in garnishment or a new type of confinement. 
If it is found that the criminal is not trustworthy, or that he is unable 
to gain employment, he would be confined to an employment project.31 
This would be an industrial enterprise, preferably run by a private concern, 
which would produce actual goods or services. The level of security at each 
employment project would vary according to the behavior of the offenders. 
Since the costs would be lower, inmates at a lower-security project would 
receive higher wages. There is no reason why many workers could not be 
permitted to live with their families inside or outside the facility, depend- 
ing, again, on the trustworthiness of the offender. Room and board would 
be deducted from the wages first, then a certain amount for restitution. 
Anything over that amount the worker could keep or apply toward further 
restitution, thus hastening his release. If a worker refused to work, he 
would be unable to pay for his maintenance, and therefore would not in 
principle be entitled to it. If he did not make restitution he could not be 
released. The exact arrangement which would best provide for high produc- 
tivity, minimal security, and maximum incentive to work and repay the 
victim cannot be determined in advance. Experience is bound to yield some 
29. Kaufmann, p. 55. 
30. The nature of judicial procedure best designed to carry out this task must be determined. 
For a brief discussion of some relevant considerations, see Laster, pp. 80-98; Burt Galaway and Joe 
Hudson, "Issues in the Correctional Implementation of Restitution to Victims of Crime," in Consid- 
ering the Victim, pp. 351-60. Also to be dealt with is the proper standard of compensation. At least 
initially, the problem of how much payment constitutes restitution would be no different than 
similar considerations in tort law. This will be considered at greater length below. 
31. Such a plan (with some significant differences) has been suggested by Kathleen J. Smith 
in A Cure for Crime. The Case for the Self-determinate Prison Sentence (London: Gerald, Duckworth & 
Co., 1965), pp. 13-29; see also Morris and Linda Tannehill, The Market for Liberty (Lansing, Mich.: 
Privately printed, 1970), pp. 44-108. 
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plans superior to others. In fact, the experimentation has already begun.32 
While this might be the basic system, all sorts of refinements are 
conceivable, and certainly many more will be invented as needs arise. A few 
examples might be illuminating. With such a system of repayment, victim 
crime insurance would be more economically feasible than at present and 
highly desirable. The cost of awards would be offset by the insurance 
company's right to restitution in place of the victim (right of subrogation). 
The insurance company would be better suited to supervise the offender 
and mark his progress than would the victim. To obtain an earlier recovery, 
it could be expected to innovate so as to enable the worker to repay more 
quickly (and, as a result, be released that much sooner). The insurance 
companies might even underwrite the employment projects themselves as 
well as related industries which would employ the skilled worker after his 
release. Any successful effort on their part to reduce crime and recidivism 
would result in fewer claims and lower premiums. The benefit of this 
insurance scheme for the victim is immediate compensation, conditional on 
the victim's continued cooperation with the authorities for the arrest and 
conviction of the suspect. In addition, the centralization of victim claims 
would, arguably, lead to efficiencies which would permit the pooling of 
small claims against a common offender. 
Another highly useful refinement would be direct arbitration between 
victim and criminal. This would serve as a sort of healthy substitute for 
plea bargaining. By allowing the guilty criminal to negotiate a reduced 
payment in return for a guily plea, the victim (or his insurance company) 
would be saved the risk of an adverse finding at trial and any possible 
additional expense that might result. This would also allow an indigent 
criminal to substitute personal services for monetary payments if all parties 
agreed. 
Arbitration is argued for by John M. Greacen, deputy director of the 
National Institute for Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. He sees the 
possible advantages of such reform as the ". . development of more 
creative dispositions for most criminal cases; for criminal victims the in- 
creased use of restitution, the knowledge that their interests were consid- 
ered in the criminal process; and an increased satisfaction with the outcome; 
increased awareness in the part of the offender that his crime was commit- 
ted against another human being, and not against society in general; in- 
creased possibility that the criminal process will cause the offender to 
acknowledge responsibility for his acts."" Greacen notes several places 
32. For a recent summary report, see Burt Galaway, "Restitution as an Integrative Punish- 
ment" (paper prepared for the Symposium on Crime and Punishment: Restitution, Retribution, and 
Law, Harvard Law School, March 1977). 
33. John M. Greacen, "Arbitration: A Tool for Criminal Cases?" Barrister (Winter 1975), p. 
53; see also Galaway and Hudson, pp. 352-55; "Conclusions and Recommendations, International 
Study Institute on Victimology, Bellagio, Italy, July 1-12, 1975," Victimology 1 (1976): 150-51; 
Ronald Goldfarb,Jails: The Ultimate Ghetto (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1976), p. 
480. 
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where such a system has been tried with great success, most notably Tuc- 
son, Arizona, and Columbus, Ohio.34 
Something analogous to the medieval Irish system of sureties might be 
employed as well." Such a system would allow a concerned person, group, 
or company to make restitution (provided the offender agrees to this). The 
worker might then be released in the custody of the surety. If the surety 
had made restitution, the offender would owe restitution to the surety who 
might enforce the whole claim or show mercy. Of course, the more violent 
and unreliable the offender, the more serious and costly the offense, the 
less likely it would be that anyone would take the risk. But for first 
offenders, good workers, or others that charitable interests found deserving 
(or perhaps unjustly convicted) this would provide an avenue of respite. 
RESTITUTION AND RIGHTS 
These three possible refinements clearly illustrate the flexibility of a 
restitutional system. It may be less apparent that this flexibility is inherent 
to the restitutional paradigm. Restitution recognizes rights in the victim, 
and this is a principal source of its strength. The nature and limit of the 
victim's right to restitution at the same time defines the nature and limit of 
the criminal liability. In this way, the aggressive action of the criminal 
creates a debt to the victim. The recognition of rights and obligations make 
possible many innovative arrangements. Subrogation, arbitration, and sure- 
tyship are three examples mentioned above. They are possible because this 
right to compensation" is considered the property of the victim and can 
therefore be delegated, assigned, inherited, or bestowed. One could de- 
termine in advance who would acquire the right to any restitution which he 
himself might be unable to collect. 
The natural owner of an unenforced death claim would be an insurance 
company that had insured the deceased. The suggestion has been made that 
a person might thus increase his personal safety by insuring with a compa- 
ny well known for tracking down those who injure its policy holders. In 
fact, the partial purpose of some insurance schemes might be to provide the 
funds with which to track down the malefactor. The insurance company, 
having paid the beneficiaries would "stand in their shoes." It would remain 
possible, of course, to simply assign or devise the right directly to the 
beneficiaries, but this would put the burden of enforcement on persons 
likely to be unsuited to the task. 
If one accepts the Lockean trichotomy of property ownership,37 that is, 
acquiring property via exchange, gifts, and homesteading (mixing one's labor 
34. Greacen, p. 53. 
35. For a description of the Irish system, see Joseph R. Peden, "Property Rights in Medieval 
Ireland: Celtic Law versus Church and State" (paper presented at the Symposium on the Origins and 
Development of Property Rights, University of San Francisco, January 1973); for a theoretical 
discussion of a similar proposal, see Spencer, pp. 182-86. 
36. Or, perhaps more accurately, the compensation itself. 
37. For a brief explanation of this concept and several of its possible applications, see Murray 
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with previously unowned land or objects), the possibility arises that upon a 
person's wrongful death, in the absence of any heirs or assignees, his right 
to compensation becomes unowned property. The right could then be 
claimed (homesteaded) by anyone willing to go to the trouble of catching 
and prosecuting the criminal. Firms might specialize in this sort of activity, 
or large insurance companies might make the effort as a kind of "loss 
leader" for public relations purposes. 
This does, however, lead to a potentially serious problem with the 
restitutional paradigm: what exactly constitutes "restitution"? What is the 
standard by which compensation is to be made? Earlier we asserted that any 
such problem facing the restitutional paradigm faces civil damage suits as 
well. The method by which this problem is dealt with in civil cases could 
be applied to restitution cases. But while this is certainly true, it may be 
that this problem has not been adequately handled in civil damage suits 
either. 
Restitution in cases of crimes against property is a manageable prob- 
lem. Modern contract and tort doctrines of restitution are adequate. The 
difficulty lies in cases of personal injury or death. How can you put a price 
on life or limb, pain or suffering? Is not any attempt to do so of necessity 
arbitrary? It must be admitted that a fully satisfactory solution to this 
problem is lacking, but it should also be stressed that this dilemna, though 
serious, has little impact on the bulk of our case in favor of a restitutional 
paradigm. It is possible that no paradigm of criminal justice can solve every 
problem, yet the restitutional approach remains far superior to the para- 
digm of punishment or any other conceivable rival. 
This difficulty arises because certain property is unique and irreplacea- 
ble. As a result, it is impossible to approximate a "market" or "exchange" 
value expressed in monetary terms. Just as there is no rational relationship 
between a wrongfully taken life and ten years in prison, there is little 
relationship between that same life and $20,000. Still, the nature of this 
possibly insoluble puzzle reveals a restitutional approach theoretically supe- 
rior to punishment. For it must be acknowledged that a real, tangible loss 
has occurred. The problem is only one of incommensurability. Restitution 
provides some tangible, albeit inadequate, compensation for personal injury. 
Punishment provides none at all.38 
It might be objected that to establish some "pay scale" for personal 
injury is not only somewhat arbitrary but also a disguised reimplementation 
of punishment. Unable to accept the inevitable consequences of restitution- 
al punishment, the argument continues, I have retreated to a pseudorestitu- 
tional award. Such a criticism is unfair. The true test in this instance is one 
of primacy of intentions. Is the purpose of a system to compensate victims 
N. Rothbard, "Justice and Property Rights," in Property in a Humane Economy, ed. Samuel L. Blumen- 
feld (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing Co., 1974), pp. 101-22. 
38. That the "spiritual" satisfaction which punishment may or may not provide is to be 
recognized as a legitimate form of "compensation" is a claim retributionists must defend. 
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for their losses (and perhaps, as a consequence, punish the criminals), or is 
its purpose to punish the criminals (and perhaps, as a consequence, compen- 
sate the victims for their losses)? The true ends of a criminal justice system 
will determine its nature. In short, arbitrariness alone does not imply a 
retributive motive. And while arbitrariness remains to some extent a prob- 
lem for the restitutional paradigm, it is less of a problem for restitution 
than for punishment, since compensation has some rational relationship to 
damages and costs. 
ADVANTAGES OF A RESTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 
1. The first and most obvious advantage is the assistance provided to 
victims of crime. They may have suffered an emotional, physical, or finan- 
cial loss. Restitution would not change the fact that a possibly traumatic 
crime has occurred (just as the award of damages does not undo tortious 
conduct). Restitution, however, would make the resulting loss easier to bear 
for both victims and their families. At the same time, restitution would 
avoid a major pitfall of victim compensation/welfare plans: Since it is the 
criminal who must pay, the possibility of collusion between victim and 
criminal to collect "damages" from the state would be all but eliminated. 
2. The possibility of receiving compensation would encourage victims 
to report crimes and to appear at trial. This is particularly true if there were 
a crime insurance scheme which contractually committed the policyholder 
to testify as a condition for payment, thus rendering unnecessary oppressive 
and potentially tyrannical subpoenas and contempt citations. Even the actu- 
al reporting of the crime to police is likely to be a prerequisite for compen- 
sation. Such a requirement in auto theft insurance policies has made car 
thefts the most fully reported crime in the Unites States. Furthermore, 
insurance companies which paid the claim would have a strong incentive to 
see that the criminal was apprehended and convicted. Their pressure and 
assistance would make the proper functioning of law enforcement officials 
all the more likely. 
3. Psychologist Albert Eglash has long argued that restitution would 
aid in the rehabilitation of criminals. "Restitution is something an inmate 
does, not something done for or to him. . . . Being reparative, restitution 
can alleviate guilt and anxiety, which can otherwise precipitate further 
of fenses."39 Restitution, says Eglash, is an active effortful role on the part 
of the offender. It is socially constructive, thereby contributing to the 
offender's self-esteem. It is related to the offense and may thereby redirect 
the thoughts which motivated the offense. It is reparative, restorative, and 
may actually leave the situation better than it was before the crime, both for 
the criminal and victim.40 
39. Albert Eglash, "Creative Restitution: Some Suggestions for Prison Rehabilitation Pro- 
grams," American Journal of Correction 40 (November-December 1958): 20. 
40. Ibid.; see also Eglash's "Creative Restitution: A Broader Meaning for an Old Term," 
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 48 (1958): 619-22; Burt Galaway and Joe Hudson, "Restitu- 
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4. This is a genuinely "self-determinative" sentence.4" The worker 
would know that the length of his confinement was in his own hands. The 
harder he worked, the faster he would make restitution. He would be the 
master of his fate and would have to face that responsibility. This would 
encourage useful, productive activity and instill a conception of reward for 
good behavior and hard work. Compare this with the current probationary 
system and "indeterminate sentencing" where the decision for release is 
made by the prison bureaucracy, based only (if fairly administered) on 
"good behavior"; that is, passive acquiescence to prison discipline. Also, the 
fact that the worker would be acquiring marketable skills rather than more 
skillful methods of crime should help to reduce the shocking rate of reci- 
divism. 
5. The savings to taxpayers would be enormous. No longer would the 
innocent taxpayer pay for the apprehension and internment of the guilty. 
The cost of arrest, trial, and internment would be borne by the criminal 
himself. In addition, since now-idle inmates would become productive 
workers (able, perhaps, to support their families), the entire economy 
would benefit from the increase in overall production.42 
6. Crime would no longer pay. Criminals, particularly shrewd white- 
collar criminals, would know that they could not dispose of the proceeds of 
their crime and, if caught, simply serve time. They would have to make full 
restitution plus enforcement and legal costs, thereby greatly increasing the 
incentive to prosecute. While this would not eliminate such crime it would 
make it rougher on certain types of criminals, like bank and corporation 
officials, who harm many by their acts with a virtual assurance of lenient 
legal sanctions.43 It might also encourage such criminals to keep the money 
around for a while so that, if caught, they could repay more easily. This 
would make a full recovery more likely. 
A restitutional system of justice would benefit the victim, the criminal, 
and the taxpayer. The humanitarian goals of proportionate punishment, 
rehabilitation, and victim compensation are dealt with on a fundamental 
level making their achievement more likely. In short, the paradigm of 
restitution would benefit all but the entrenched penal bureaucracy and 
enhance justice at the same time. What then is there to stop us from 
overthrowing the paradigm of punishment and its penal system and putting 
in its place this more efficient, more humane, and more just system? The 
proponents of punishment and others have a few powerful counterargu- 
ments. It is to these we now turn. 
tion and Rehabilitation-Some Central Issues," Crime and Delinquency 18 (1972): 403-10. 
41. Smith, pp. 13-29. 
42. An economist who favors restitution on efficiency grounds is Gary S. Becker, although he 
does not break with the paradigm of punishment. Those interested in a mathematical "cost-benef it" 
analysis should see his "Crime and Punishment," Journal of Political Economy 76 (1968): 169-217. 
43. This point is also made by Minocher Jehangirji Sethna in his paper, "Treatment and 
Atonement for Crime," in Victims and Society, p. 538. 
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OBJECTIONS TO RESTITUTION 
1. Practical criticisms of restitution. It might be objected that "crimes 
disturb and offend not only those who are directly their victim, but also the 
whole social order."' Because of this, society, that is, individuals other than 
the victim, deserves some satisfaction from the offender. Restitution, it is 
argued, will not satisfy the lust for revenge felt by the victim or the 
"community's sense of justice." This criticism appears to be overdrawn. 
Today most members of the community are mere spectators of the criminal 
justice system, and this is largely true even of the victim.45 One major 
reform being urged presently is more victim involvement in the criminal 
justice process.' The restitution proposal would necessitate this involve- 
ment. And while the public generally takes the view that officials should be 
tougher on criminals, with "tougher" taken by nearly everyone to mean 
more severe in punishing, one must view this "social fact" in light of the 
lack of a known alternative. The real test of public sympathies would be to 
see which sanction people would choose: incarceration of the criminal for a 
given number of years or the criminal's being compelled to make restitution 
to the victim: While the public's choice is not clearly predictable, neither 
can it be assumed that it would reject restitution. There is some evidence to 
the contrary.47 
44. Del Vecchio, p. 198. 
45. William F. McDonald, "Towards a Bicentennial Revolution in Criminal Justice: The 
Return of the Victim," American Criminal Law Review 13 (1976): 659; see also his paper "Notes on 
the Victim's Role in the Prosecutional and Dispositional Stages of the Criminal Justice Process" 
(paper presented at the Second International Symposium on Victimology, Boston, September 1976); 
Jack M. Kress, "The Role of the Victim at Sentencing" (paper presented at the Second International 
Symposium on Victimology, Boston, September 1976). 
46. McDonald, pp. 669-73; Kress, pp. 11-15. Kress specifically analyzes restitution as a means 
for achieving victim involvement. 
47. In two types of studies conducted for the Ventura County Board of Supervisors, Ventura, 
California, support for a restitutional program was indicated: "Both the citizen attitude survey and 
the Delphi goal-setting exercise revealed a strong concern for the victim as the 'forgotten man' of 
criminal justice. The Delphi panelists, in particular, emphasized the need for new kinds of criminal 
penalties in which the offender would be required to make restitution to his victim(s)" (Development 
of a Model Criminal Justice System [Santa Barbara, Calif.: Public Safety Systems, 1973], p. 85). The 
report recommends the implementing of a system of restitution. In the two cities mentioned earlier 
(Columbus and Tucson), support, at least by the parties involved, appeared strong. In the thousands 
of cases arbitrated by trained law students in Columbus, only 4 percent proceeded further up in the 
criminal system. In Tucson after one year the program has been successful in all but nine of 204 
cases (with the cost of handling each case at $304 compared with $1,566 required to process the 
average felony case). General approval of restitution in lieu of punishment was indirectly referred to 
in the Columbia Law Review's oft-cited study, "Restitution and the Criminal Law": "[E]ven where the 
complainant can be persuaded to continue the criminal case, after having received private satisfaction, 
his apathy is often so pronounced and his demeanor so listless that he becomes an extremely weak 
witness. . . . Also the knowledge of actual restitution seems to greatly assuage the jury. Even the 
knowledge of the existence of a civil suit can lead the jury to recommend leniency or acquittal" (39 
[1939]: 1189; see also n. 31). Restitution, it seems, is accepted and preferred by the average person. 
Early studies indicate that, when properly administered, even offenders perceive a restitutionary 
sanction as fair (William Marsella and Burt Galaway, "Study of the Perceived Fairness of Restitution 
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This brings us to a second practical objection: that monetary sanctions 
are insufficient deterrents to crime. Again, this is something to be discov- 
ered, not something to be assumed. There are a number of reasons to 
believe that our current system of punishment does not adequately deter, 
and for the reasons discussed earlier an increase in the level of punishment 
is unlikely. In fact, many have argued that the deterrent value of sanctions 
has less to do with severity than with certainty,48 and the preceding consider- 
ations indicate that law enforcement would be more certain under a restitu- 
tional system. In the final analysis, however, it is irrelevant to argue that 
more crimes may be committed if our proposal leaves the victim better off. 
It must be remembered: Our goal is not the suppression of crime; it is doing 
justice to victims. 
A practical consideration which merits considerable future attention is 
the feasibility of the employment project proposal. A number of questions 
can be raised. At first blush, it seems naively optimistic to suppose that 
offenders will be able or willing to work at all, much less earn their keep 
and pay reparations as well. On the contrary, this argument continues, 
individuals turn to crime precisely because they lack the skills which the 
restitutional plan assumes they have. Even if these workers have the skills, 
but refuse to work, what could be done? Would not the use of force to 
compel compliance be tantamount to slavery? This criticism results in part 
from my attempt to sketch an "ideal" restitution system; that is, I have 
attempted to outline the type toward which every criminal justice system 
governed by the restitution paradigm should strive. This is not to say that 
every aspect of the hypothetical system would, upon implementation, func- 
tion smoothly. Rather, such a system could only operate ideally once the 
paradigm had been fully accepted and substantially articulated. 
With this in mind, one can advance several responses. First, the prob- 
lem as usually posed assumes the offender to be highly irrational and 
possibly mentally unbalanced. There is no denying that some segment of 
the criminal population fits the former description.49 What this approach 
neglects, however, is the possibility that many criminals are making rational 
choices within an irrational and unjust political system. Specifically I refer 
to the myriad laws and regulations which make it difficult for the unskilled 
or persons of transitory outlook" to find legal employment."1 I refer also to 
as a Sanction for Juvenile Offenders" [paper presented to the Second International Symposium on 
Victimology, Boston, September 1976]). 
48. Yochelson and Samenow, pp. 453-57. 
49. For a discussion rejecting the usefulness of the latter description, see Szasz, pp. 91-146; for 
a recent study verifying Szasz's thesis, see Yochelson and Samenow, esp. pp. 227-35. 
50. Edward C. Banfield put forth his controversial theory of time horizon in his book The 
Unheavenly City (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1970) and amplified it in The Unheavenly City Revisited 
(Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1974), and most recently, "Present-orientedness and Crime" (paper 
prepared for the Symposium on Crime and Punishment: Restitution, Retribution, and Law, Harvard 
Law School, March 1977). For a critical, but favorable analysis of this approach, see Gerald P. 
O'Driscoll, Jr., "Professor Banfield on Time Horizon: What Has He Taught Us about Crime?" 
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the laws which deny legality to the types of services which are in particular 
demand in economically impoverished communities.52 Is it "irrational" to 
choose to steal or rob when one is virtually foreclosed from the legal 
opportunity to do otherwise? Another possibility is that the criminal choos- 
es crime not because of foreclosure, but because he enjoys and obtains 
satisfaction from a criminal way of life.53 Though morally repugnant, this 
is hardly irrational. 
Furthermore, it no longer can be denied that contact with the current 
criminal justice system is itself especially damaging among juveniles."4 The 
offenders who are hopelessly committed to criminal behavior are not usual- 
ly the newcomers to crime but those who have had repeated exposure to the 
penal system. In Kuhn's words, "Existing institutions have ceased to meet 
the problems posed by an environment they have in part created."'" While a 
restitutionary system might not change these hard-core offenders, it could, 
by the early implementation of sanctions perceived by the criminal to be 
just, break the vicious circle which in large part accounts for their existence. 
Finally, if offenders could not or would not make restitution, then the 
logical and just result of their refusal would be confinement until they 
could or would. Such an outcome would be entirely in their hands. While 
this "solution" does not suggest who should justly pay for this confine- 
ment, the problem is not unique to a restitutionary system. In this and 
other areas of possible difficulty we must seek guidance from existing pilot 
programs as well as from the burgeoning research in this area and in 
victimology in general. 
2. Distributionary criticisms of restitution. There remains one criticism 
of restitution which is the most obvious and the most difficult with which 
to deal. Simply stated, it takes the following form: "Doesn't this mean that 
rich people will be able to commit crimes with impunity if they can afford 
it? Isn't this unfair?" The practical aspect of this objection is that whatever 
deterrent effect restitution payments may have, they will be less for those 
most able to pay. The moral aspect is that whatever retributive or penal 
(paper prepared for the same symposium). A contrary, but ultimately compatible view is presented 
by Yochelson and Samenow, pp. 369-72. 
51. For example, minimum wage laws, and so-called closed-shop union protectionist legisla- 
tion. 
52. For example, laws prohibiting gambling, prostitution, sale of drugs, "jitney" cab services, 
etc. 
53. "It is not the environment that turns a man into a criminal. Rather it is a series of choices 
that he makes at a very early age. . . . [T]he criminal is not a victim of circumstances" (Yochelson 
and Samenow, pp. 247, 249). This is in essence the main conclusion of their research. (For a concise 
summary of their provocative book, see Joseph Boorkin, "The Criminal Personality," Federal Bar 
Journal 35 [1976]: 237-41.) In The Criminal Personality, vol. 2, The Process of Change (New York: 
Jason Aronson, Inc., 1977) they relate and examine the methods they have employed to change the 
criminal thought pattern. Of course, such an approach can itself be subject to abuse. 
54. See, e.g., Edwin M. Schur, Radical Noninterventionism, Rethinking the Delinquency Problem 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973). 
55. Kuhn,-p. 92 (emphasis added). 
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effect restitution payments may have they will be less for those who are 
well off. Some concept of equality of justice underlies both considerations. 
Critics of restitution fail to realize that the "cost" of crime will be 
quite high. In addition to compensation for pain and suffering, the criminal 
must pay for the cost of his apprehension, the cost of the trial, and the 
legal expenditures of both sides. This should make even an unscrupulous 
wealthy person think twice about committing a crime. The response to this 
is that we cannot have it both ways. If the fines would be high enough to 
bother the rich, then they would be so high that a project worker would 
have no chance of earning that much and would, therefore, have no incen- 
tive to work at all. If, on the other hand, you lower the price of crime by 
ignoring all its costs, you fail to deter the rich or fully compensate the 
victim. 
This is where the option of arbitration and victim crime insurance 
becomes of practical importance. If the victim is uninsured, he is unlikely 
to recover for all costs of a very severe crime from a poor, unskilled 
criminal, since even in an employment project the criminal might be unable 
to earn enough. If he had no hope of earning his release, he would have 
little incentive to work very hard beyond paying for his own maintenance. 
The victim would end up with less than if he had "settled" the case for the 
lesser amount which a project worker could reasonably be expected to earn. 
If, however, the victim had full-coverage criminal insurance, he would 
recover his damages in full, and the insurance company would absorb any 
disparity between full compensation and maximal employment project 
worker's output. This cost would be reflected in premium prices, enabling 
the insurance company which settled cases at an amount which increased 
the recovery from the criminal to offer the lowest rates. Eventually a 
"maximum" feasible fine for project workers would be determined based 
on these considerations. The "rich," on the other hand, would naturally 
have to pay in full. This arrangement would solve the practical problem, 
but it should not be thought of as an imperative of the restitutional para- 
digm. 
The same procedure of varying the payments according to ability to 
pay would answer the moral considerations as well (that the rich are not 
hurt enough) and this is the prime motive behind punitive restitution pro- 
posals. However, we reject the moral consideration outright. The paradigm 
of restitution calls not for the (equal) hurting of criminals, but for restitu- 
tion to victims. Any appeal to "inadequate suffering" is a reversion to the 
paradigm of punishment, and by varying the sanction for crimes of the 
same magnitude according to the economic status of the offender it reveals 
its own inequity. Equality ofjustice means equal treatment of victims. It should 
not matter to the victim if his attacker was rich or poor. His plight is the 
same regardless. Any reduction of criminal liability because of reduced 
earning power would be for practical, not moral, reasons. 
Equality of justice derives from the fact that the rights of men should 
be equally enforced and respected. Restitution recognizes a victim's right to 
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compensation for damages from the party responsible. Equality of justice, 
therefore, calls for equal enforcement of each victim's right to restitution. 
Even if necessary or expedient, any lessening of payment to the victim because of the 
qualities of the criminal is a violation of that victim's rights and an inequality of 
justice. Any such expedient settlement is only a recognition that an imper- 
fect world may make possible only imperfect justice. As a practical matter, 
a restitutional standard gives victims an enormous incentive to pursue 
wealthy criminals since they can afford quick, full compensation. Contrast 
this with the present system where the preference given the wealthy is so 
prevalent that most victims simply assume that nothing will be done. 
The paradigm of restitution, to reiterate, is neither a panacea for crime 
nor a blueprint for utopia. Panaceas and utopias are not for humankind. We 
must live in a less than perfect world with less than perfect people. Restitu- 
tion opens the possibility of an improved and more just society. The old 
paradigm of punishment, even reformed, simply cannot offer this promise. 
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
Space does not permit a full examination of other less fundamental 
implications of such a system. I shall briefly consider five. 
1. Civil versus criminal liability. If one accepts a restitutionary standard 
of justice, what sense does it make to distinguish between crime and tort, 
since both call for payment of damages? For most purposes I think the 
distinction collapses. Richard Epstein, in a series of brilliant articles, has 
articulated a theory of strict liability in tort."6 His view is that since one 
party has caused another some harm and one of the parties must bear the 
loss, justice demands that it falls on the party who caused the harm. He 
argues that intention is only relevant as a "third-stage" argument; that 
notwithstanding some fault on the part of the plaintiff (a second-stage 
argument), the defendant intended the harm and is therefore liable.57 With 
a restitutional system I see no reason why Epstein's theory of tort liability 
could not incorporate criminal liability into a single "system of corrective 
justice that looks to the conduct, broadly defined, of the parties to the case 
with a view toward the protection of individual liberty and private proper- 
ty. 
X18 
56. Richard A. Epstein, "A Theory of Strict Liability in Tort," Journal of Legal Studies 2 
(1973): 151-204. 
57. Richard A. Epstein, "Intentional Harms," Journal of Legal Studies 3 (1975): 402-8; see also 
his article "Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict Liability," ibid., 3 (1974): 174-85. 
58. Epstein, "Intentional Harms," p. 441. Epstein himself would disagree. In a recent article, 
also notable for its well-reasoned rejection of victim compensation/welfare schemes, "Crime and 
Tort: Old Wine in Old Bottles" (paper prepared for the Symposium on Crime and Punishment: 
Restitution, Retribution and Law, Harvard Law School, March 1977), he draws an emphatic distinc- 
tion between tort and criminal law. He rests this distinction on two characteristics of the criminal 
law: (a) that its function is to punish (and therefore mens rea is required and more stringent 
procedural safeguards are appropriate), and (b) since the defendant is prosecuted by the state, fairness 
as between the parties is not relevant. From these assumptions, Epstein reasons quite correctly that 
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There would, at least initially, be some differences, however. The cal- 
culation of damages under the restitutionary paradigm which includes cost 
of apprehension, cost of trial, and legal costs of both parties would be 
higher than tort law allows. A further distinction would be the power of 
enforcers to confine unreliable offenders to employment projects.59 
2. Criminal responsibility and competency. Once a criminal sanction is 
based not on the offender's badness but on the nature and consequences of 
his acts, Thomas Szasz's proposal that the insanity plea be abolished makes 
a great deal of sense ,' as does his argument that "all persons charged with 
offenses-except those grossly disabled-[are fit to stand trial and] should 
be tried.""6 On this view, Epstein's concept of fairness as between the parties 
is relevant. A restitution proceeding like a "lawsuit is always a comparative 
affair. The defendant's victory ensures the plaintiff's [or victim's] defeat. 
. . . Why should we prefer the injurer to his victim in a case where one 
may win and the other lose? . . . As a matter of fairness between the 
parties, the defendant should be required to treat the harms which he has 
inflicted upon another as though they were inflicted upon himself."62 
3. Victimless crimes. The effect of restitutional standards on the legali- 
ty of such crimes as prostitution, gambling, high interest loans, pornogra- 
phy, and drug use is intriguing. There has been no violation of individual 
rights, and consequently no damages and, therefore, no liability. While 
some may see this as a drawback, I believe it is a striking advantage of the 
restitutional standard of justice. So-called victimless crimes would in princi- 
ple cease to be crimes. As a consequence, criminal elements would be 
denied a lucrative monopoly, and the price of these services would be 
the two systems are inherently different. It should be obvious that a restitutionary paradigm under- 
mines both assumptions. Gilbert M. Cantor in his article, "An End to Crime and Punishment" 
(Shingle 39 [May 1976]: 99-114), takes precisely this view, arguing that "the time has come to 
abolish the game of crime and punishment and to substitute a paradigm of restitution and responsi- 
bility. I urge that we assign (reassign, actually) to the civil law our societal response to the acts or 
behaviors we now label and treat as criminal. The goal is the civilization of our treatment of 
offenders. I use the word, 'civilization' here in its specific meaning: to bring offenders under the 
civil, rather than the criminal law; and in its larger meaning: to move in this area of endeavor from 
barbarism toward greater enlightenment and humanity" (p. 107; emphasis in original). 
59. It would seem that the only way to account for these differences would be an appeal to the 
means rea or badness of the criminal as opposed to the unintentional tortfeasor. Yet such an approach, 
it might be argued, is not available to a restitutionary system which considers the moral outlook of 
an offender to be irrelevant to the determination of the proper criminal sanction. A possible response 
is that this overstates the restitutionist claim. That a criminal's mental state does not justify punish- 
ment does not imply that it is not relevant to any aspect of the criminal justice process. It may well 
be that it is relevant to the consideration of methods by which one is justified in extracting what, on 
other grounds, is shown to be a proper sanction, that is, restitution. 
60. Szasz, pp. 228-30. 
61. Ibid., pp. 228-29. "The emphasis here is on gross disability: it should be readily apparent 
or easily explicable to a group of lay persons, like a jury" (p. 229). But even the qualification of gross 
disablement might be unjustified (see Yochelson and Samenow, pp. 227-35). 
62. Epstein, p. 398. In his article "Crime and Tort: Old Wine in Old Bottles," he takes exactly 
this approach with the insanity defense in tort law. 
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drastically reduced. Without this enormous income, organized crime would 
be far less able to afford the "cost" of its nefarious activities than it is 
today. 
4. Legal positivism. What is true for victimless crimes is true for the 
philosophy of legal positivism. On the positivist view, whatever the state 
(following all the correct political procedures) says is law, is law; hence, 
whatever the state makes a crime is a crime. A restitutional standard would 
hold the state to enforcing individual rights through the recovery of indi- 
vidual damages. 
5. Legal process. Because the sanction for crime would no longer be 
punitive, the criminal process could explore less formal procedures for 
dispute settlement. Also, the voice of the victim would be added to the 
deliberations. One possible reform might be a three-tiered verdict: guilty, 
not proven, and not guilty. If found "guilty," the offender would pay all 
the costs mentioned above. If the charges are "not proven," then neither 
party would pay the other. If found "not guilty," the defendant would be 
reimbursed by the enforcement agency for his costs and inconvenience. 
This new interpretation of "not guilty" would reward those defendants 
who, after putting on a defense, convinced the trier of fact that they were 
innocent. 
These and many other fascinating implications of restitution deserve a 
more thorough examination. As any new paradigm becomes accepted, it 
experiences what Kuhn calls a period of "normal research," a period charac- 
terized by continuous expansion and perfection of the new paradigm as well 
as a testing of its limits. The experimentation with restitutionary justice 
will, however, differ from the trial and error of the recent past since we will 
be guided by the principle that the purpose of our legal system is not to 
harm the guilty but to help the innocent-a principle which will above all 
restore our belief that our overriding commitment is to do justice. 
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